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The object of this study is the importance of the so-called 'cross-border elernent'
in the case law of the EC Court of Justice in Luxernbourg conceming free
rnovement. The fundamental freedoms of tl-re EC Treaty are free rnovetnent of
goods, persons, services and capital. The question is whether the case law will
change in relation to the intensity of the mentioned element. In u'hat rvay does a
weak cross border element influence the case law of the Court? At first face
there are tluee different categories of case law. First there is a category in rvhich
the Court decides that Community law is not at stake. Literally the judges use
here the word'purely internal situations'. On the facts the situation is com-
pletely witirin the borders of one and the same rnember state. Therefore the free-
doms are not jeopardized. Secondly the Court can limit its testing to a criteriunr
of discrimination. This criterinm retums in case law in dir,erse fomrs. There is
the obligation of national treatment, here are also wider concepts like indirect of
substantive discrimination. In the third place there is case law where all obsta-
cles to free movement are forbidden by the Court. Does the choice of one of
these three categories relate to the nature or the intensity of the cross-border
elernent?
In this study tl're word cross border element is not only seetr itr its geo-
graphical meaning. A wider view of this element in the sense of point of rat-
tachment to one of the fundamental freedoms is added. A geographical cross
border element is a factual question and the Court prefers to leave the rveighing
of the facts to the national courts, that have asked prelintinary questions to the
European Court. Understanding the concept of cross border element only in its
geograpl-rical meaning would have lirnited the scope of the research in this book
too rnuch.
The underlying motive for this research is the distinction in tluee different
meanings of the word freedom in'free movement of goods, persons etc.', made
by Kapteyn and Verloren van Themaat in their manual of European Law, Inle-
iding tot het recht van de Europese Gemeenscltappez. According to these
authors'free movement of...' has three possible meanings in the context of the
regulation of interstate trade and movements. The first concept of freedom pro-
hibits any measure, which hinders interstate trade. This is a very wide concept of
freedom indeed. The second concept prohibits measures, which exclusively
conceru importation, exportation, immigration or emigration. The third and last
concept is generally known in international law and concerns a discrimination
concept, mostly in the form of an obligation of national treatment. In the chap-
ters on the specific freedoms these freedom concepts are used as points of de-
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parture. In tl-re large amount of case law that has been studied the Court does not
always separate in a clear way the different freedorn concepts. The question is
rvhether there is any sorl of explanation for the use of a particular concept and
whether a cross-border element is of importance in this context. Such an elernent
is  used by the Court  to  determine the ' re levance'  or 'per t inence'of  the ef fect  or
luature of a national measure in the l ight of the specific freedom at stake. This
'relevance' test is in my opinion essential. When all 'relevant' points of rat-
tacllnent are contained within one and the same Member-State, then there is not
a cross-border element and 'a pure internal situation' within one Member-State.
This means that the EC and the Court are not competent to deal with the situa-
tion. It is up to the Member-State concerned to change its laws or not. In my
vierv the dividing l ine between 'a pure internal situation' and the situation where
a certain freedom concept is used is very thin indeed.
In fact, this test is one test. There are essentially two steps in free movement
larv. Tlre first step is the printa facie 
'relevance' test. At first sight the Court
decides rvhether a national rreasure has some effects that are detrimental to the
goals these f reedoms t ry  to real ise.  This ' re levance'a lso refers to a suf f ic ient
cross-border  e lement  in  the geographical  sense.  The'ef fet  ut i le 'o f  the speci f ic
freedor.r, is of interest here. The necessary relation with the freedom is not so
much a factual relationship as well as a furrctional relationship.
The second test is a reasonabil ity or justif icatory test. This test takes into
account the goals the national govemment wants to realise with its measure. In
European Law this test is called tlte rule of reason. This two step test has been
strongly recommended in th is  s tudy.  I t  is  indeed a ' test  of  compat ib i l i ty ' for  a l l
freedoms. The second test can only follow when the first test has been passed,
e.g. wlren there is a printa facie case of relevance. The first test can be seen as an
outer l irnit, the second test as an inner l imit. The second test has to be passed
before a measure can be declared as contrary to the Treaty. This two step test
represents better most case law conceming the four freedoms than a rule-
exception approach. The first printa facie test, especially when the first broad
concept of freedom is used, makes possible a large control of national measures
by the Court. But the national measure is only contrary to the Treaty, when there
is no justificatory ground or when the rule of reason applies. National regulatory
conrpetences have to be treated carefully, even when prima facie a freedom is
touched upon.
In the chapters 4 - 7 the question is asked whether the use of a freedom
concept can be related to the nature and intensity of the cross-border element
present in a case. Case law concerning the ' internal situation' is also analysed
for each freedom.
Most freedoms fit into the two step test. The exception is customs duties and
levies of equivalent effect. Financial burdens or levies are against the principle
of the customs union. The freedom concept is very strict here. The duties or
levies are per se prohibited. It is here only, that the old rule-exception approach
should be upheld. Even ' internal' burdens or levies are caught by the Treaty
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dispositions on tire customs union. For all other lreedoms the two step test
should apply. Diverse pieces of national legislation are under close scrutiny of
tl-re CoLrrt. Any measure relevant for the specific freedom at stake should be
tested trrrder the prima facie test. It is submitted that the first freedom concept is
preferred to a discrimination concept. Discrimination is not what free movement
is about. Broad definitions like those in Dassont,ille and Sager and also Geblrurd
are excellent in defining the scope of the freedoms.
The case law concerning the so-cal led ' in ternal  s i tuat ion '  wi l l  in  rny opin ion
be more and more replaced by a remoteness test. Some situations are too indirect
or too hlpothetical to be of interest for a specific freedom. These situations can
but need not be geographical intemal situations. And this is exactly rvhat the
prima facie test is about, a test concerning the relevance of a national nreasure
frout the perspective of a specific freedom. Tl-re cross-border elelneut is of great
i rnpor lance to th is  lest .
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